North Korea conducted its first nuclear test 9 October 2006, after which it conducted new tests roughly every three years up through 2017 (one in 2009, one in 2013, and then two in 2016 and one in 2017). Since then, it has been under a self-imposed testing moratorium. This testing moratorium has occurred alongside the continued development of nuclear weapons, specifically smaller tactical nuclear weapons.
With big, rare events like a nuclear test, there's a strong default toward the bottom bin, the question almost always being "why now (if ever)?" if we were to ask if North Korea were to conduct its seventh nuclear test (I'm assuming a detonation won't occur as an overtly hostile act) soon, we'd then lean heavily toward "no." However, if we were to ask if North Korea will, some day, conduct another nuclear test, I think most of us would say "almost certainly." Which means the question "why not now?" is also valid, especially when past practice indicates that they're overdue for one.
Reasons not to test soon could be that they're not as far along as the South Korean and US governments think in their "miniaturization" process or that threats by the US and its allies will cause cooler heads to prevail. North Korea may figure that it will get its point across with some sabre rattling, moving ballistic missile launchers close to the frontline, etc. It has sabre rattled in recent years without conducting a nuclear test.
Reasons to test soon would be that they are far enough along and want to test smaller tactical nuclear weapons. North Korea also uses nuclear weapons as a "badge" that bring it attention and legitimacy on the world stage and may want to re-insert itself into the international conversation.
The next South Korean presidential election will occur in 2027 and the next legislative election in 2028. This makes the 2024 US presidential election the nearest election of relevance to the North Korean government if it wanted a test to either potentially influence a political outcome or simply to place itself in the arena. The North Korean government has already said that it wishes to re-start nuclear talks if Trump is re-elected.
I'm going to put large odds in the last bin like most of the crowd but a little bit larger odds than the crowd so far in the first bin. My sense is that if the North Korean government wants to make itself heard, before or maybe just after the presidential election is probably the best time. If Harris wins, the odds go up for the second and third bins and if Trump wins the odds go down for those bins.
North Korea conducted its first nuclear test 9 October 2006, after which it conducted new tests roughly every three years up through 2017 (one in 2009, one in 2013, and then two in 2016 and one in 2017). Since then, it has been under a self-imposed testing moratorium. This testing moratorium has occurred alongside the continued development of nuclear weapons, specifically smaller tactical nuclear weapons.
With big, rare events like a nuclear test, there's a strong default toward the bottom bin, the question almost always being "why now (if ever)?" if we were to ask if North Korea were to conduct its seventh nuclear test (I'm assuming a detonation won't occur as an overtly hostile act) soon, we'd then lean heavily toward "no." However, if we were to ask if North Korea will, some day, conduct another nuclear test, I think most of us would say "almost certainly." Which means the question "why not now?" is also valid, especially when past practice indicates that they're overdue for one.
Reasons not to test soon could be that they're not as far along as the South Korean and US governments think in their "miniaturization" process or that threats by the US and its allies will cause cooler heads to prevail. North Korea may figure that it will get its point across with some sabre rattling, moving ballistic missile launchers close to the frontline, etc. It has sabre rattled in recent years without conducting a nuclear test.
Reasons to test soon would be that they are far enough along and want to test smaller tactical nuclear weapons. North Korea also uses nuclear weapons as a "badge" that bring it attention and legitimacy on the world stage and may want to re-insert itself into the international conversation.
The next South Korean presidential election will occur in 2027 and the next legislative election in 2028. This makes the 2024 US presidential election the nearest election of relevance to the North Korean government if it wanted a test to either potentially influence a political outcome or simply to place itself in the arena. The North Korean government has already said that it wishes to re-start nuclear talks if Trump is re-elected.
I'm going to put large odds in the last bin like most of the crowd but a little bit larger odds than the crowd so far in the first bin. My sense is that if the North Korean government wants to make itself heard, before or maybe just after the presidential election is probably the best time. If Harris wins, the odds go up for the second and third bins and if Trump wins the odds go down for those bins.